The thought of representation and gender equality

There are days for just analyses. Femin Ijtihad has posted two analysis on the thought of representation and gender equality in Islam and Muslim societies. These are some excerpts.

Syed Jamil’s article on the representations of Muslim women in neo-colonial imagination, Islamic canonical texts, and the feminist response.

“…this essay does not seek to establish the ‘Truth’ regarding Muslim women as it exists in the world of social reality. Rather, it seeks to examine how various representations of Muslim women, as networks of signs where the signified is infinitely delayed, are constructed and to what effects and consequence these representations are mobilized” (432).

So long as we confine our conception of the political to activity that is openly declared we are driven to conclude that subordinate groups essentially lack a political life or that what political life they do have is restricted to those moments of popular explosion. To do so is to miss the immense political terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt and that, for better or worse, is the political environment of subject classes. It is to focus on the visible coastline of politics and miss the continent that lies beyond (Scott 1990: 199)’” (438).

“This is the unspoken ground of the unsaid on which patriarchy traces the narrative of women’s subjugation: the existence of a deep-seated and insubordinate – almost subversive – consciousness directed against the patriarchal order” (438).

How can I explain the relationship between gender inequality and Islam?

It’s important to recognize that gender discrimination is not particular to the Islamic world, nor does it reflect essential “Islamic” values or practices. Rather, gender inequality in the Muslim world is often the result of historical, political, cultural, and economic factors, and many discriminatory laws, traditions, and practices that maintain the second-class status of women in Muslim societies are not necessarily related to the core messages of Islamic sacred texts. Therefore, there is no essential reason that  “Islam” and women’s rights can’t exist side by side.

Think about:

- Are discriminatory practices towards women in my community justified as symbols of Islamic identity or explained as key parts of ‘our culture,’ in contrast to Western culture and values? Are women in my community considered guardians of specific Islamic values?

-Who makes the argument that gender inequality is essential to Islam? Why do they feel that making this argument is important, and what are the best ways to approach them?

-What alternatives are there within the Islamic tradition, across all sects, to these interpretations, and how can they be promoted?

-How can I be heard and respected as I participate the debate over ‘what Islam means’ within my community?

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I was so proud of the F.I. team, Sara Bergamaschi, Sarah Jones and Deya Bhattacharya, in their recent representation at the London School of Economics for a panel presentation.

Contemporary debates and historical identities: Evolving conceptions of pluralism in Islam and the future of women’s rights in post-revolutionary Libya

For some contemporary jurists, concepts like ijtihad create space for innovative interpretations of shari’ah, and allow a jurisprudence that protects gender equality. Conservatives resist this as an assault on Islam’s theological purity and historical identity. Through interviews conducted with activists and analyses of the theological structures in Islam that frame this debate over reform, we intend to critique the current state of gender equality in Libya and gauge the potential effects of this intellectual conflict on the political inclusion of Libyan women.

 

Is Islam Mysticism really Islam

By Omid Safi

There is a lovely story from the life of the Prophet Muhammad, remembering that a mysterious visitor came upon him and his companions. The visitor, later revealed to be the archangel Gabriel, proceeded to sit intimately next to Muhammad and quiz the Prophet. He asked Muhammad about three increasingly higher and deeper levels of religiosity, which the Prophet answered sequentially as Islam (wholehearted submission to God), Faith and, lastly, Loveliness (ihsan). This third quality the Prophet identified as worshipping God as if we could see the Divine, and if we cannot, to always remember that God nevertheless sees us.

The sequence is fascinating, as it reveals that what we think of as Islam (the attestation to Divine Unity, the performance of the prayers, the pilgrimage to Mecca, the paying of the alms tax, the fast of Ramadan) mark only the very first layer — though the foundational layer — of religiosity. Above that is faith, and above faith is the spiritual and mystical layer of spiritual beauty, for ihsan is literally the realm of actualizing and realizing beauty and loveliness (husn), of bringing beauty into this world and connecting it to God, who is the All-Beautiful.

Throughout Islamic history, this realm of ihsan was most emphatically pursued by the mystics of Islam, the Sufis. Historically, this mystical realm of Islam formed a powerful companion to the legal dimension of Islam (sharia). Indeed, many of the mystics of Islam were also masters of legal and theological realms. The cultivation of inward beauty and outward righteous action were linked in many of important Islamic institutions. In comparing Islam with Judaism, the mystical dimension of Islam was much more prominently widespread than Kabbalah. And unlike the Christian tradition, the mysticism of Islam was not cloistered in monasteries. Sufis were — and remain — social and political agents who went about seeking the Divine in the very midst of humanity.

After the Prophet Muhammad, many of the most influential of all Muslims were and remain mystics. Mawlana Jalal al-Din Balkhi, known to Turks as Mevlana and to Americans as Rumi, remains the most beloved of all Sufi poets, whose Masnavi was perhaps the only work ever compared directly with the Quran. Ibn ‘Arabi, the Spanish Muslim sage, remains the most widely read metaphysician, and his school of “Unity of Being” (Wahdat al-wujud) has been both influential and controversial from Spain to Indonesia. The most important Muslim theologian, al-Ghazali, identified the realm of Sufism as the highest Islamic quest for knowledge, one that dealt most directly with other-worldly matters.

Nor was the practice of Islamic mysticism limited to intellectuals and poets. At the level of popular practice, some of the Sufi shrines received as many (if not more) annual visitors that the Mecca does for the Hajj pilgrimage. Entire Muslim-majority regions (Iran, Turkey, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, etc.) came to develop understandings of Islam that are and remain inseparable from mystical understandings of Islam. Much of the higher dimensions of Islamic aesthetics (calligraphy and poetry) have been inseparable from Sufism.

Read More: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/omid-safi/is-islamic-mysticism-real_b_841438.html

‘Awrah and Fitnah: Women’s Modesty and Social Ills.

Fadl, one of the world’s leading authorities on Islam and Islamic law writes about the conflation between ‘awrah (modesty) and fitnah (social ills). This is all contained within a book of 360 pages, footnoted and well-referenced. “Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women” One World Publications 2006.

He makes these claims:

1. The Quran does not use the word fitnah to refer to sexual arousal/seduction. It refers, instead, to non-sexual temptations such as material consumption (money) and a ripple of other social ills.

2. Early Islamic reports did not link the issue of the hijab to the problem of fitnah. The technical issue of the proper form of hijab is not directly related to the possibilities of fitnah, but to social status and physical safety. Interestingly, what becomes known in modern discourses as the hijab is discussed in classical juristic sources in the chapter on prayer.

3. Fadl invites us to ASK whether the problem of fitnah (fitnah determination) is an EMPIRICAL or DOCTRINAL issue. Meaning: is detriment of women’s immodesty to social ills determined by doctrine (Quran, Sunnah), or is it empirical, i.e. determined by people’s observation/experiment, and then read into the doctrine.

Fadl does not debate out the causal relation of whether ‘awrah leads to fitnah, in determining the extent to which women’s modesty should be regulated. He disregards this causal relationship on the basis of one over-arching principle, that is a core Shariah value.

There is a serious conceptual and moral difficulty with the idea of fitnah. The principle that no one can be called to answer for the sins of another is a core Shariah value. In Quranic discourses, one person or a set of people cannot be made to suffer because of the indicretions, sins, or faults of others – each individual is responsible and accountable only for his or her own behaviour. (Quran 6;164, 17;15, 35;18, 39;7, 53;58, 24;11)

In fact when addressing the issues of modesty, the Quran is quite careful to place the blame on those it labels the hypocrites, who harass or molest the innocent. (Quran 33;58-60). Reportedly these verses were revealed in response to several incidents in which the hypocrites of Medina harassed and molested Muslim women. (Tafsir al-Tabari, Kathir, al-Qurtubi al Jami, al Razi al-tafsir al Kabir)

The jurisprudence on women’s modesty thus runs the risk of violating (going against) the Quranic principle of self-responsibility/self-accountability for one’s own discretions, sins or faults.

He continues: Assuming that the reason we are confronted with a fitnah situation is because of men with an overactive libido (uncontrolled sexual drive) or who are impious (not religious) or ill-mannered (rude). Demanding that women should suffer exclusion or limitations would violate the principle that the innocent should not pay for the indiscretions of the culpable (the one to be blamed). From that perspective the whole logic between fitnah as seduction becomes quite suspect. Whether a person covers his or her awrah or not, he or she should not be made to suffer from the indiscretions (lacking in good judgement) or impiety (lack of respect for God) of others.

The laws and imperatives of modesty ought to be set by God and not by immoral individuals who are violating the law of God.

Fitnah determinations rely on the dubious logic that women should pay the price for the impious failures of men. Therefore, according to this logic, women’s education, mobility, safety, and even religious liberty should be restricted in order to avoid fitnah.

Under the guise of fitnah some women have been banned from serving in the military, working, driving, appearing in public life. Fadl asserts that this has resulted from the abusive treatment of the evidence (Sunnah), and an extreme lack of willingness to implement critical insight into evidence that could have dire consequences in perpetuating intolerable injustices against women.

The first point of inquiry : do fitnah determinations make an empirical or normative claim? Are these traditions saying that as an empirical matter, women will always have this affect on men? If the answer is yes, then the question is, what if the empirical reality contradicts the claim of the tradition (Sunnah)? In the science of hadith, any tradition that contravenes (goes against) human experience cannot be accepted as valid. So for instance, if a tradition says that the people of Yemen walk on 3 legs, since the tradition is empirically incorrect, it cannot be relied upon in legal determinations.

The Chapter is pretty long so I will put up his arguments in bullet points:

  • There are many Hadith that objectifies women’s bodies as site of immodesty.
  • Fadl’s claim is that we are unable to ascertain that the Prophet played the primary role in the authorial enterprise that generated these traditions. Since we are unable to ascertain this, considering the impact of these traditions, (and the higher values of social justice espoused in the Quran – see above), there is no possible justification for taking the tradition at their word.
  • Difficult to reconcile the traditions of fitnah and women’s exclusion with the numerous reports about the active participation of women in public life during the life of the Prophet and after his death as well.
  • Reports documenting incidents of women’s seclusion are few in comparison with those documenting the opposite.
  • Reports of women’s public participation includes:

a) Prophet racing his wife in public

b) Aisha and other women watching sports in Medina

c) One of the widely reported incidents is one in which a group of women were meeting with the Prophet. Apparently their voices had become quite loud; when Umar entered upon the rowdy group, the Prophet laughed at how quickly everyone quieted down.

d) Women used to take Prophet by his hand, sit him down to discuss their problems.

e) The mosque of the Prophet was full of rows of women lining up for prayers. At times, men arriving late for prayer would pray behind women – men would be in the front rows followed by women, followed by rows of men who arrived late. Yet the prayers of the men who prayed behind the women were considered valid.

f) The Prophet wanted all women to join the community in Eid prayers and that he urged even menstruating women to listen to the sermon and join in the celebrations. Several reports stated that women attend iktikaf prayer with the Prophet in the mosque, and did so during menstruation.

  • The overwhelming majority of the traditions of the fitnah genre do not purport to describe a historical practice. Rather they present declarations, aspirations, claims or normative prescriptions. Fadl introduces that many men (transmitters of the Hadith) were fueled by the laxity (not strict) of the Prophet’s dealings with women. Afraid that their women might argue against them (as many did), attributions to their womanhood and sexuality were made. If these traditions are to be believed, then there was an enormous disparity between the these declarations, and the actual historical practice of the Prophet in Medina.
  • Umar for instance shares his worries to the Prophet. “One day I became mad with my wife and she started arguing with me. When I chided her for talking back, she said “Why do you hink I cannot argue with you! By God, the wives of the Prophet argue with him and one even abandoned him from morning until night.” I told her, “Whoever does this is truly shameless!” How do they know that God might not become angered because of the hurt caused to the Prophet, and then they would be truly ruined! In response to ‘Umar’s reports, the Prophet smiled!
  • Some claim that all this took place before the imposition of the hijab. Fadl raises this: The hijab was introduced to the Prophet’s wives in the very last years before his death. Taking that the hijab extends to all other women and cancels out all other hadith on women’s active and public participation with men, then we end up with a peculiar result that most of the Islamic historical experiences becomes an utter nullity (becomes erased), as far as gender relations are concerned.

Launch of F.I.’s New Case Law Project

Waking up Saturday morning to a large cup of tea is wonderful. I have armed myself with new wrist guards, went to the doctor and hand therapist. There really isn’t a quick cure, but I am committed to improving the condition of my wrists and living healthily and happily.

F.I. Tidbits

Our case law project has just launched. I stayed up to 1am to e-meet the team of 7 people, some students, some former journalists and passionate in their field. It is such an important project and I am so glad to have found and met Anna Dugoni (Our Project Coordinator) to have really made such an intensive task so easy on me!

About the Project

The need to make decisions available to the public domain, as scholars/activists have acknowledged a lack of women’s awareness on the legal developments that affect their lives and on legal tools that they can use to argue their cases. Thus, the aim is to provide a free compendium of Muslim family and criminal case law in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and promote a greater awareness of the law amongst women, legal activists and lawyers in these and other communities.

‘The efforts at legal reform in the field of family law (DMMA, MFLO) are useful fragments of hope for women’.

Likewise, Indian Muslim law as argued by Subramanian (2008:633) ‘changed over the last generation to give permanent alimony, to restrict men’s right to unilaterally repudiate their wives and to give earlier wives the right to get a divorce if their husbands practice polygamy’he thrust must now be on saving these laws and on implementation of whatever little reprieve they offer’ (Ali, 1998a: 136).

How can judgements impact on women’s lives, when women themselves, and the communities they live in, believe that they have been legally divorced? Much more needs to be done to move towards a gender-just Muslim matrimonial law’ ( Saumya Uma, 2003).

    to ‘unravel women’s rights by interpreting the basic texts of islam from a gender-equal perspective’ (ali, 2000: 5). Thus we aim to show how judges have interpreted the scriptures and whether ijtihad has been resorted to, to provide new interpretations.

I am glad I was able to take some time in the last few days to include new information onto our F.I. website. Visit http://www.feminijtihad.com

Love,